EPR-like phenomena are (presumably) indeterministic, but they furthermore suggest that our world involves seeming-strange "funny business." Without invoking any heavy mathematics, the theory of branching spacetimes offers two apparently quite different ways in which EPR-like funny business goes beyond simple indeterminism. (1) The first is a modal version of a Bell-like correlation: There exist two space-like separated indeterministic initial events whose families of outcomes are nevertheless modally correlated. That is, although the occurrence of each outcome of each of the two space-like separated initial events is separately possible, some joint occurrence of their outcomes (one from each) is impossible. (2) The second sounds like superluminal causation: A certain initial event can bear a causelike relation to a certain outcome event without being in the causal past of that outcome. The two accounts of EPR-like funny business are proved equivalent, a result that supports the claim of each as useful to mark the line between mere indeterminism and EPR-like funny business. ¡ This is a "postprint" based on the version published in Non-locality and modality, eds. T. Placek and J. Butterfield, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 2002, pp. 293-315. The archive at http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu contains two recent related articles by the author, "No-common-cause EPR-like funny business in branching space-times" (2002) and "A theory of causation: causae causantes (originating causes) as inus conditions in branching space-times" (2002).
Determinism, indeterminism, funny business
The language of branching space-times 1 as it is spelled out in Belnap 1992 is austere, concerning as it does only the causal ordering on possible point events of our world 2 and without any mention of probabilities. 3 By refraining from invoking the rich language needed for anything like a quantum-mechanical account, this very austerity appears to permit a sharp and simple delineation of three ways our world might be.
1. It might be strictly and universally deterministic: Given any initial event, its outcome is uniquely determined, which is to say, there is only one possible outcome.
2. It might be indeterministic, so that some initial events face multiple incompatible possibilities for their futures; but without any features that are EPRlike. (It was plausible to think of radium decay like that.)
3. It might be (and indeed seems to be) not only indeterministic, but exhibiting EPR-like "funny business," as I will say. 4 The aim of this study is to add to our understanding of these distinctions, and especially to help with the much-too-fuzzy idea of "EPR-like funny business." Contri-1 Note the profound difference between "branching space-times" on the one hand and so-called "branching time" on the other. "Branching time," with "time" in the singular, is not, incidentally, good terminology, since there is no reason not to let "time" connote a linear order. The phrase is, however, fixed in a large literature, and to try to use another would be quixotic. On the other hand, "branching space-time," as in the title of BST-92, is little used, so that it seems reasonable to try to replace it, as I do here, with the less misleading plural phrase "branching space-times." This usage recognizes the intention that the branching be between space-times. Both branching time and branching space-times place a causal order on concrete "events," but in branching time, the terms of the causal order are giant Laplacean "simultaneity slices," not tiny little point events. Branching time can be used to represent a global version of indeterminism, but not-in the absence of additional vocabulary-seriously local indeterminism such as can be represented when one puts a causal order on point events. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 of Belnap, Perloff and Xu 2001 contain some foundational discussions pertaining to indeterminism as it is represented in "branching time" theory, including a sustained argument against employing the idea of an "actual future" in thinking about indeterminism, and a careful account of how one living in an indeterminist world must use the future tense. These discussions remain relevant when the switch is made to branching space-times. 2 For instance, no language of "systems," "states," "particles," "laws," or "theories." 3 Perhaps more thinkers than not claim to understand probability while finding possibility mysterious. You cannot, however, have probability without possibility. If you want to be technical, possibility lies in the so-called "probability space," an understanding of which seems essential to any adequate understanding of applied probability. 4 Adding probabilistic language permits consideration of a concept of Bell-like funny business; but that is not our topic.
butions to this end can come from many quarters, historical, theoretical, experimental, metaphorical, etc. 5 My working hypothesis is that there can be complementary benefit by seeing what can be done within the "pre-physical" and even pre-metric language of branching space-times (BST-92 6 ) whose only primitives are (1) the notion of point event and (2) a causal order on them in terms of which one can define ideas and relations that illuminate both indeterminism and space-time. The thought is that staying within the confines of what is there called "branching space-times" encourages one to try to make the three-fold distinction between determinism, indeterminism, and EPR-like funny business in a fashion that is sharp (absolutely rigorous), simple (only two uncomplicated primitives; no heavy mathematics), and intuitive (which is of course a subjective matter).
Trying, however, is not succeeding: I'll first go over some suggestions that are at best only partially successful. (There are obvious cases of such funny business that do not fall under those versions.) The aim of this study to give accounts that may or may not be "final," but are anyhow better than those that I initially survey. I give two that one may hope are satisfactory:
Generalized primary space-like-related modal-correlation funny business Some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business.
Each, which is rigorously defined in terms of the primitives of BST-92 theory, is intended to express a fundamental feature of one aspect (only) of quantummechanical wonderment. 7 These two ideas are proven to be in a certain sense equivalent, which I offer as evidence of their stability and suitability to their purpose. What purpose? I suggest that BST-92 theory, though "pre-physical" 8 rather than "physical," is a seriously helpful guide to broad-gauge physical understanding that goes beyond mere metaphor or arm-waving about the indeterminist and funny-business aspects of our world.
I begin with a hurried review of some fundamental definitions, postulates, and facts. Then I develop the two ideas of "funny business," and finally prove the supporting equivalence. 5 In addition to offering his own approach, Placek 2000 provides valuable access to a rich variety of different such contributions.
6 "BST-92" refers to the particular way in which the idea of branching space-times is worked out in Belnap 1992 . The branching space-times theories of McCall 1994 and Placek 2000 share much of the underlying motivation of BST-92, but differ in key ways with respect to primitives, postulates, and definitions. Rakić 1997 puts the BST-92 version into a useful perspective. 7 The language of BST-92 is not known to permit, for example, a representation of something as basic as the quantized nature of quantum-mechanical concepts; but since it does not pretend to do so, this is hardly a defect.
8 A physicist after hearing a lecture once indicated impatience with the ideas of BST-92 by labeling them "common sense." Would that it were so.
Ancillary ideas of branching space-times
The BST-92 idealization of the causal structure of our world invokes just two primitives: the set of all possible point events (each taken to be as fully concrete as any point event in our actual past), which I call Our World (OW for short), and the causal order on them, . Define 
Postulates and basic definitions
All but one of the postulates of BST-92 are standard order-theoretic postulates. As can be seen from BST-92, however, each plays a definite role in giving an account of how histories branch from each other (indeterminism); none is given for its mere space-time content. That is why there are so few, as follows.
OW is a nonempty set; its members are called point events, written ¡ and sometimes
. is a partial order on OW (reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric). There are no maximal elements (
An outcome chain, written ( , is a nonempty lower bounded chain, and each outcome chain ( has an infimum, written ) 1 0 2 4 3 5 ( 7 6 .
A history, written 8 , is a subset of OW that is maximal with respect to containing an upper bound for each pair of its members. 9 Facts: Every point event is a member of (and every chain is a subset of) some history (by Zorn's lemma); each history is closed downward; and no history has a member that is maximal in that history.
An initial chain, written 9 , is a nonempty and upper bounded chain, and each initial chain 9 has a supremum in each history 8 of which it is a subset,
9 Each history may usefully-but optionally-be pictured as a Minkowski space-time. It is to our purpose in clarifying indeterminism and funny business, however, that there be not nearly enough postulates to force that interpretation.
A point event ¡ © ¢ prior to (or identical with) ¡ belongs equally to both histories; relative to that earlier point event ¡ ¢ , both future historical courses are equally possible. After ¡ , however, no matter what happens next, at least one of 8 4 ¢ and 8 # § can only be termed "was possible but isn't anymore." Splitting at a point event is extended to sets of histories in a natural fashion, as follows. (Here and below we let 
Definitions: Propositions and their truth, events and their occurrence
BST-92 permits a tightly organized and intuitively sensible theory of propositions to the effect that such and such an event "occurs."
10 It must be added that in connection with a theory of how probabilities work in branching spacetimes, M. Wiener discovered the necessity of an additional postulate to the effect that given two initial chains and two histories, the order of the respective suprema is preserved as the histories are varied. The consequences of this postulate are not used here.
11 Choice? All there is to say in the language of BST-92 is that up to and including both histories remained possible futures, but immediately after (and indeed forever after ) that was no longer true. Perhaps this is also a place to remark that my use of tensed constructions is wholly unobjectionable, but makes sense only if one pictures oneself somewhere within Our World, for example, somewhere in . One can of course retail the same causal facts tenselessly. See Chapters 6 and 8 of Belnap et al. 2001 for a careful working out of how tenses must be used in the context of indeterminism.
In the spirit of possible-worlds theory, a proposition is a set of histories BST-92 permits consistency concepts that are both rigorous and natural. The reason for this is its controlled treatment of the relation between events and propositionsconsistency is prima facie understandable only for propositions, but BST-92 can then piggy-back consistency for events on propositional consistency. 
Definitions and facts: transitions and spreads
In order to put the matter of funny business in the clearest possible light, I first develop the notions of "transition" and "spread," which come from Szabo and 12 There are good things to mean by "proposition" other than the given timeless sense, and other good ways to use "occurs." The current definitions are offered nonexclusively, as useful in their own right. I note that if one wishes to indulge in a tensed usage of "occur" that is both carefully controlled by theory and also easy to understand, it would appear to be better to insert a past tense: a certain initial or outcome event "occurred"; or, if reference to the future is wanted, "will have occurred." (Note 1 above cites a careful discussion of how the future tense must be understood in the context of indeterminism.) Belnap 1996 . This development is alas a bit tedious, but it is hard to be clear about the ideas without it.
A chain transition is defined as an ordered pair of an initial This line of thought (which the article BST-92 suggests as the heart of its account) leads to the following definitions and facts.
, and being separated at
, but given that presupposition alone, beingundivided-at and being-separated-at must have opposite truth values. Because it is an equivalence relation, undividedness at ¡ gives us a smooth theory of primary propositional outcomes, transitions, and spreads.
) is a primary propositional outcome of ¡ , and every primary propositional outcome of ¡ can be expressed in the form
is the set of all primary propositional outcomes of ¡ ; which is to say, iff 
These natural moves between the chain and propositional ideas of primary transition and spread, having been concentrated here, will be made without comment.
The beginning of this section introduced general ideas of chain transitions and spreads, but as yet we haven't made room for the general ideas of propositional transitions and spreads.
. When the subset relation is proper, the transition is contingent.
These last ideas are perhaps too general to be of much service, and they are used here just a little. Observe that even this very abstract idea of "spread" insists on some sort of location in branching space-times via the location of 9 . 18
17 Since the matter is not as memorable as one might have hoped, I call attention to the fact that with respect to a certain history, our jargon allows that an event occurs or not, whereas a proposition is true or not.
18 There is room left for "proposition-proposition" transitions and spreads, but I know of no particular application for them.
Generalized primary space-like-related modal-correlation funny business
What is a "modal correlation," and when does it constitute EPR-like "funny business"? If you have two spreads each with its own set of possible outcomes, then "correlation" means that knowing what happens at one of them gives you some information about what happens at the other. 19 In a "modal correlation," the information is in terms of consistency and inconsistency.
We can get the right definition of "modal correlation" by paying attention to the most general case. Suppose we have two chain-proposition spreads 9 Y ¢ ¢ and 9 § ' § .
If we specify both the two spreads and an inconsistent pair of outcomes (one from each), we say that we have a modal correlation.
It is built into the notation (and the "given" clauses) that the outcome 
Simplest kind of space-like-related modal-correlation funny business
Whether modal or probabilistic, correlation between spreads 9 Y ¢ £ ¢ and 9 § ' § is, as such, uninteresting; it happens too often. It seems part of the literature concerning various quantum-mechanical "entanglement" phenomena such as EPR that a key feature of the interesting (surprising?) cases is that the correlation occurs between space-like related measurements. If one for the moment idealizes a measurement as a primary spread, a suggestive kind of a priori deduction of the relevance of space-like relatedness becomes possible. To see this, let us first give the definition of "space-like related" from BST-92.
The epistemic language is of course only for expository convenience. 20 Modal correlation is a stronger property than probabilistic correlation. Contrariwise, absence of modal correlation means much less than absence of probabilistic correlation.
This definition of "space-like related" is the same as that of Minkowski spacetime, with one addition required by BST-92: There must be at least one history that contains both point events. They cannot be inconsistent.
It is "scientifically natural" to find interest in a case of two primary spreads at space-like remove that are nonetheless correlated, and the upcoming "deduction" does not touch on the sufficiency of being space-like related for being interesting. Rather, I show that if the initials of two primary spreads are not space-like related, then there is no interest in their modal correlation.
Consider then two primary spreads ¡ ¢ ¡ P and ¡ § ¡ P # "
. There are three ways (1)-(3) in which their initials can fail to be space-like related. In each of these cases, I indicate why the question of modal correlation is obviously uninteresting. 
. So in this case, modal correlation is trivially inescapable. Since the existence of inconsistent pairs of point events is a consequence of the merest hint of even straightforward no-funny-business indeterminism (that is, it follows from the bare existence of more than one history), such modal correlations do not by themselves warrant our interest. 
Figure 1: BST-92 picture of Einstein-Rosen-Podolski.
22 Two comments.
(1) The phrase "outcome-determining" is redundant. It is intended to highlight the role of the histories in defining a particular modal correlation; namely, the histories serve only to determine which two outcomes are inconsistent. (2) The passage from "inconsistent" to "not spacelike related" is valid only for the present case, where the initials are single point events, but fails when later we consider initials that are sets of point events. Then two initials in the more general sense can be (according to the definitions we give) both space-like related and inconsistent.
Simplest cases of SLR modal-correlation funny business are EPR-like. The BST-92 picture of EPR is given in Figure 1 . 23 EPR is overkill for SLR modal correlation in two ways. (1) Not only are ¡ ¢ and ¡ § consistent, but they occur in exactly the same histories. (2) There is more than one joint outcome that is impossible: Both
Informally we can say this by the following: If you are sitting immediately after ¡ ¢ , then you are sure to know exactly what you will find out has happened at ¡ £ § , namely, the opposite sign. To see how EPR itself goes beyond the weakest sort of SLR modal correlation, look at Figure 2 . Here, sitting just after ¡ Y ¢ , if you see that a " § " has happened, then you know which outcome of ¡ § you will eventually find in your past; but if you see that a " " has happened, then you know nothing (yet) about which outcome of ¡ D § you will eventually find in your past. That is because there is only a single modal correlation. 24 I still suggest that this is "essentially" the same, however, as the EPR case. What is "essential" is that there be at least one modal correlation (impossible joint outcome).
If might by the definition be a trivial spread, but let us put this aside: Assume that both are nontrivial. Then the situation is this: Although the primary spreads originating in ¡ £ ¢ and ¡ § are space-like separated, and although in each case there is no predetermination of which outcome comes to be, it is nevertheless 23 BST-92 is about many space-times branching. To picture this is not so easy, and to explain the pictures is even more difficult. The convention is that a figure represents each history in Our World with a separate two-dimensional Minkowski diagram. Identically labeled point events are identical, each typically belonging to more than one history. If the regions immediately after a labeled point event are marked the same in two histories (for example, in ), the convention is that the labeled point event is a "choice point": The two histories split at that point event, so that after the choice point, no point events-not even those on light-like paths emanating from the choice point-are common to the two histories. A further "negative" convention is that using the same mark for the immediate future of distinct labeled point events (for example, in Figure 2 , "¡ " after both and " in ¢ ) has no strictly causal meaning. When worrying about indeterminism and funny business according to BST-92, "similarity" doesn't count. 24 It seems to me certain that anyone who is sufficiently familiar with quantum mechanics should be able to rig up an experimental situation having the causal shape described in Figure 2 ; that is part of what I intend by suggesting that BST-92 can serve as a sort of guide to finding one's way around amid scary physics. I myself cannot give you a concrete example, however, because I fail the test of familiarity. 25 If two primary transitions are each trivial, they have one and only one joint outcome, which, if they are space-like-related, must certainly be consistent and hence not a modal correlation. guaranteed in advance that a certain combination of outcomes will not happen. 26 This is a type of EPR-like "funny business" abstractly described. I intend this as kind of a claim: If you yourself come across a concrete pair of measurement-like situations for which this idealization seems apt, then you yourself will find that you have found something that belongs in the EPR family with regard to its causal structure.
One should reject the converse: There are kinds of funny business that are not space-like-related modal correlations of the simplest kind. Each of Figure 3 and Figure 4 is an illustration of funny business that does not, however, exhibit SLR modal correlation of the simplest kind. Look at Figure 3 . There is no SLR modal correlation of the simplest kind. If you want a modal-correlation account of this funny business that is like the simplest kind in its concentration on single-pointevent initials, you have to divide into three space-like separated initials rather than just two. You will find that each of these three initials has its own outcomes, but that there is a combination of one outcome from each that is impossible (namely, the combination).
Primary space-like related modal correlation generalized
There is, however, a way to keep our primary SLR modal-correlation account binary and still have it apply to this case, and this is the way that we take. 27 Let one initial consist of two point events instead of just one; namely, let the initials be defined as sets of point events that are consistent in the way that an initial should be:
26 In pictures this looks like "missing histories." Thinking in this way with your right brain is fine as long as it does not lead you to decide that funny business is abnormal. 27 Szabo and Belnap 1996 works with SLR correlations that are neither binary nor primary. Note that here I am not trying to use "intuition" in order to show up Figure 3 as exhibiting funny business; I have already done that. Now the task is to see how to modify a binary account in order to apply to this case.
is an initial event
Let range over arbitrary initial events: is always a nonempty set of point events that is consistent in the sense that they occur together in at least one history. Let ¢ = ¡ ¢ in Figure 3 , and let
, by our prior definitions. We need, however, to figure out what to mean by ¡ ¥ ¡ when the initial is more than a single point event. A tactic that plays out well in the present context is to define a "generalized primary propositional outcome" of an initial event via quantified undividedness. 29 
; and a generalized primary propositional spread is defined as a spread having the form ¡ § ¡ . 28 We defined an initial chain as requiring an upper bound, which is indeed a necessary condition of having a supremum. In the present investigation, however, the upper-bound requirement has seemed unnecessary in connection with using the more general notion of an initial event.
29 The double-orthocomplement idea as employed in Placek 2000 (p. 143) should not be neglected.
Let "GP" stand for "generalized primary."
With these definitions, Figure 3 is a GP propositional outcome of ; and evidently we have a modal correlation:
Further, and this is an essential observation, each member of ¢ is space-like related to each member of § , so that we have not just any modal correlation; we have a space-like-related modal correlation. Let us convert this observation to a definition.
That is, to say of two initial events that they are space-like related is to say that each member of one is space-like related to each member of the other. 30 Now that all concepts are sharply defined, we can enlarge the account of SLR modal correlation: 
It is easy to see that the funny business illustrated in Figure 3 falls under this account, so that it no longer stands as a counterexample to the thesis that all situations exhibiting EPR-like funny business fall under the rubric of "SLR modal correlation" as defined in the language of BST-92. SLR modal correlation of the simplest kind may not be enough, but it is worth conjecturing that the more generalized notion is indeed "enough." I express this conjecture by means of the following definition. 2) In such a case, by the theorem to be proved, you will also find a case of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business. 31 The adjective "primary" is important. When outcomes are distant from initials, then SLR modal correlation is not enough for funny business, since the correlation can be due to perfectly "ordinary" circumstances such as a "common cause." In the primary case, however, there is, as we have suggested in Section 2.3, no "room" for additional causal "influences" from the past. relatedness of ¢ and ¡ © , we have a bona fide case of GP SLR modal-correlation funny business described in strict BST-92 terms.
Rather than further retail testing of the conjecture that GP SLR modal-correlation funny business catches all EPR-like phenomena to the extent that the language of BST-92 makes that possible, I turn to a second approach to funny business. The proof that the two approaches come to the same thing is offered as evidence of their individual stability.
Some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business
The second effort at extracting a notion of funny business tries to find inspiration in the (I should think incontestable) fact that when we look for a token-causal explanation of why things are one way rather than another, we always look to the past. Something like this thought lies behind much discussion of Reichenbach's "common cause" principle as for example in Szabo and Belnap 1996 or Placek 2000 , and also behind the prior choice principle of BST-92 cited in Section 2.1.
Cause-like locus (simplest kind)
My approach to the second notion of funny business begins with a contrastive observation: Modal correlation invokes the idea of undividedness between histories at a point event, whereas the prior choice principle relies for its statement on the idea of separation. Separation is as important as undividedness, maybe more so. I suggest that separation is cause-like. Start with the prior choice postulate, which says that if some history is inconsistent with the beginning-to-be of ( Why do I say "cause-like" instead of "causal"? There are three reasons. The first is merely to avoid premature commitment to a theory of causality. 34 The second and more important reason depends on the observation that this notion of "cause-like locus" does not include a statement that ¡ lies in the past of ( . We know of course by the prior choice postulate that at least one cause-like locus for ( lies in its past. The point is that the prior choice postulate says that something cause-like lies in the past of ( , but it is no part of the definition of what is said to lie in the past (namely, a cause-like locus) that in fact it does so. Because of this analytical separation, it makes sense to inquire of a particular cause-like locus whether or not it lies in the past. Of course our instincts almost drive us to declare that whatever is a cause must occur in the past; but the analytical separation enshrined in the phrase "cause-like" allows us to appreciate the third reason, which is critical: Neither the definition of cause-like locus nor the prior choice postulate commit us to the theory that all cause-like loci for ( lie in the past of ( . And in fact in numerous EPR-like situations, although (according to the present suggested analysis) invariably some cause-like locus does lie in the past, some cause-like locus for ( fails to lie in its past. This makes quick intuitive statements liable to be misleading. For example, it would seem as if the meaning of the prior choice principle of BST-92 is that "causes lie in the past," and the principle is defended intuitively by the observation that when looking for a token-explanation of why things are the way they are rather than otherwise, we always look to the past. It is therefore arresting to learn that the principle only says that there is always at least one cause-like locus in the past; it does not say that all of them lie there.
This suggests that the existence of a cause-like locus that fails to reside in the past is itself a plausible account of what is strange about EPR-like phenomena. If there is a place (in Our World) where a transitional determination is made as to whether the beginning of some outcome event remains possible on the one hand or is made impossible on the other, one would expect that place to be in the past. 35 So: 34 Research proposal for a happy syntax of causation: Construe "causes"-and perhaps "effects" as well-as transitions in Our World. The role of transitions in understanding causation is emphasized in Xu 1997 . 35 The sense of "expect" here is tied to a particular mental set; perhaps it is akin to the special sense in which one expects that there be no "irrational" or "imaginary" numbers.
A history 8 , an outcome chain ( , and a point event ¡ constitute a case of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business of the simplest kind
The account needs generalizing, and in two directions. The "cause-like locus" needs generalizing from a single point event ¡ to the more complex idea of an initial event (a set of point events) and the "outcome event" in question also needs to be generalized to take account of outcomes of a sort too complex to be represented by a single outcome chain. Each of these generalizations will bring some subtleties in their respective trains.
From to

¡ as cause-like locus
The need to generalize the "causal locus" from point event ¡ to initial event we can see from either of two previous examples. Consider that in Figure 4 8 is inconsistent with ( Q § . In this diagram there is no some-cause-like-locus-not-inpast funny business of the simplest kind; that is, in essence, because no single point event except ¡ © : For every history in which ( Q § occurs, there is a "splitter" in that splits that history from 8 . What's funny is that although can count as an adequate "cause-like locus" for ( Q § , no part of it falls in the causal past of ( § . So noticing this fact is one way of seeing something funny about the causal structure exhibited in also suffices as cause-like locus, even though no part of lies in the causal past of ( ¢ . These examples suggest that the idea of separation, which starts with histories splitting at point events (8 F ¢ I W P # 8 # § ), needs to be generalized, and I have already done so in one way, having defined 8
. A further generalization is, however, essential. One wishes to be able to say that 8 is separated from ¡ at a set of point events , meaning that which member of might be needed for separation might depend on which member of ¡ is to be separated from 8 . This idea needs to be existential: 
Relevance of a cause-like locus
Before one can base on these thoughts a rigorously defined more general notion of cause-like locus and a more general notion of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business, one needs to face up to a consideration that comes into play only after separation-at-¡ is generalized to separation-at-. My prose description of this kind of funny business implicitly relied, in a certain way, on the fact that you need only to separate 8 from
¡ © "
. In what way? If is too large, it may well contain loose pieces. The nub is that since 8 I ¡ ¡ © is existential on , separation is preserved even if a number of irrelevant "junk" point events are added to . These "extra" points-the ones that do no work in the separation-could be anywhere without affecting the truth of 8 I ¡ ¡ ¡ ©
. Therefore, one would certainly not have a reason to issue a judgment of "funny business" just because some of these "extra" point events failed to lie in the past of ( . So at this point a refinement is needed. We wish to be able to say that each member of is relevant to separating 8 from ¡ © . That's not the same as "essential": I just mean that is "entirely relevant" in the sense that each piece of can be used in the separation. I mean that 
From to
¡ as an outcome event
In order to complete generalizing some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business, one needs to see that representing outcome events as outcome chains ( is too 36 Such a set is not necessarily "minimal" with respect to separating ¢ from ¤ ¦
; it could be that one of its proper subsets also suffices. It just turns out that relevance matters whereas minimality does not matter.
special. Just as I generalized from single-point-event initials ¡ to consistent setsof-point-events initials , so I now generalize from single-outcome-chain outcome events ( to sets-of-outcome-chains outcome events . Then it will be possible to prove the equivalence of the statements that there is funny business in the GP SLR modal-correlation sense with funny business in the some-cause-like-locus-not-inpast.
For a simple case in which the more generalized notion of outcome is needed, consider once more Figure 3 So an outcome event can have disjoint pieces, and to say that it occurs is to say that each piece begins to be. 38
is a cause-like locus for with respect to
37 This definition seems helpful, but there is no reason to believe that it is exclusively so. See note 29. 38 The idea of representing certain events as sets of sets is due to von Kutschera 1993, an idea that is also made use of by Xu 1997. It is obvious that the source of the idea lies in theoretical considerations rather than "common sense"; those considerations seem to me to be powerful.
To say that an initial event "does not lie in the past of" an outcome event is to say something doubly universal: for every ¡ and every ( ¤ , ¡ ¤ ( (no member of the initial event lies in the past of any member of the outcome event).
An initial event and a history 8 and an outcome event constitute a case of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business R S V U is a cause-like locus for with respect to 8 , but no member of lies in the causal past of any member of . This is our "final" account of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business. It might be adequate to all cases of EPR-like funny business to the extent that they can be represented in the language of BST-92. Evidence in this direction is provided by the fact, to be proved shortly, that there is a case of some-causelike-locus-not-in-past funny business if and only if there is a case of generalized primary space-like-related modal-correlation funny business.
Equivalence of the two ideas of funny business
Let us state again what counts as a case of funny business in each of the two senses. 
5-1 DEFINITION. (Two ideas of funny business)
An initial event and a history 8 and an outcome event constitute a case of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business R S V U is a cause-like locus for with respect to 8 , but no member of lies in the causal past of any member of .
We aim to show agreement between the notion of generalized primary SLR modal-correlation funny business and the some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past accounts of funny business in the following sense.
5-2 THEOREM. (Equivalence of two ideas of funny business)
There is a case of generalized primary space-like-related modal-correlation funny business iff there is a case of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business. This is a consequence of the two conditionals Lemma Lemma 5-3 and Lemma Lemma 5-4. Here is the first half. 
We aim to prove the existence of a case of some-cause-like-locus-not-in-past funny business. We can use 8 L as-is; so we want to use L , R , and 8 R somehow in order to find an L and an R such that 
Then by prior choice there is bound to be an 
I am picturing the affair in two dimensions, using "L" informally to point to the left wing and "R" to the right.
¥ X Q 8
R , the latter because 
, and ). We proceed to define ordinal-length sequences of initial events, histories, outcome chains, and point events in such a way as to guarantee that eventually we will reach a stage exhibiting a GP SLR modal correlation: 41 40 I am using "R" as associated with the outcome, imagined on the right, and "L" as associated with the initial, imagined on the left, that is not in its past. 41 The circularity of (e)-(h) is only apparent: . The first part of (3) together with (d) implies (6), which implies (7) when used with (5).
(e)
The first part of (8) is a consequence of (b), whereas the second part follows from (4) and (3) are space-like related. By definition that requires first that they be distinct, which follows from (c) and (3) and (4). Space-like relatedness also requires that ¡ L and ¡ ¥ ¤ are consistent (belong in common to at least one history) and are not causally ordered. It will suffice to find two histories that split at each of ¡ L and ¡ ¥ ¤
, for points at which two histories split must belong to those histories (so that those points must be consistent), and the points must also be maximal in the intersection of the two histories (so that neither can lie in the causal past of the other).
We proceed as follows. , (7) and (10) 
Conclusion
The equivalence of the two notions of funny business supports the underlying conjecture of this essay, namely, that the theory of BST-92 plus a no-funny-business postulate gives us a good idealization of a world that is as indeterministic as you like, and even filled with Bell-like probabilistic correlations, but nevertheless innocent of EPR-like funny business. The conjecture is that the defined ideas of EPR-like funny business cut at a joint. 42 
